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THE DIFFICULT CASE OF DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER DRUG ADVERTISING
David C. Vladeck*
I. INTRODUCTION
This well-deserved and long overdue tribute to Steven Shiffrin,
one of the leading First Amendment theorists of our time, provides a
welcome opportunity to re-examine Professor Shiffrin's core
teachings about the complexity of the First Amendment. The
symposium organizers asked that I focus on the commercial speech
doctrine. I happily undertook the assignment because my own
thinking about commercial speech has been heavily informed by
Professor Shiffrin's writings. For that reason, I have focused my
attention on The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away
from a General Theory of the First Amendment, Professor Shiffrin's
early but highly influential critique of the commercial speech
doctrine.'
Away from a General Theory is as timely today as it was when it
was published over two decades ago. In it, Professor Shiffrin sets
forth a sweeping critique of conventional commercial speech theory
* Professor of Law and Director, Center on Regulation and Governance, O'Neill Institute
for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown University Law Center. In the interest of full
disclosure, I practiced as an attorney with Public Citizen Litigation Group ("PCLG") prior to
joining the Georgetown faculty. While at the PCLG, I represented parties on both sides of
commercial speech cases. I represented parties opposing restraints in a number of cases,
including Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) and Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626 (1985). 1 also represented parties submitting amici briefs supporting speech
restraints in many cases, including Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) and Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). Public Citizen Litigation Group also represented the plaintiffs in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976), and submitted briefs or amici for parties in many of the cases discussed in this article. I
would like to extend my special thanks to Steve Shiffrin for sharing his thoughts on this Essay
and on commercial speech matters more generally and to Meagan Winters and Jeffrey Jensen for
their research assistance.
1. 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1984). The article has been cited by courts and commentators
hundreds of times, including the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 n.6 (1985).
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that places him outside both of the two competing camps of First
Amendment theorists. As Professor Shiffrin explains, neither camp
fully grapples with the complexities embedded in government
regulation of speech relating to commercial and economic activity.2
Professor Shiffrin's critique gently but decisively exposes the flaws
in each approach.3
Professor Shiffrin uses the article first to distance himself from
theorists-I will call them "pro-protectionists"-who embrace the
advent of the commercial speech doctrine as an important doctrinal
step forward, but who, at the same time, criticize the Court for going
only half-way by failing to bestow full First Amendment protection
to commercial speech.' Although Professor Shiffrin is no fan of
"hierarchies" of First Amendment protection, he sees the pro-
protectionist approach as too simplistic.' For one thing, this
approach disregards the reality that, at times, the government must
regulate speech in the course of legitimate economic regulations
(e.g., regulation of the sale of securities), and that full constitutional
protection for such speech might inhibit the government's ability to
advance important societal interests.6 For another, pro-protectionist
theorists overlook the complicated definitional issues that arise when
the government regulates economic activity that has an effect on
speech-complexities that in Professor Shiffrin's view make the
commercial speech doctrine an incomplete answer to a poorly
framed question.7
Professor Shiffrin spends even more energy challenging those
who argue that expanding the domain of the First Amendment to
cover commercial speech is ill-conceived.' These commentators-
2. E.g., Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 1224.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1261 (arguing that depending on its context, the Court permitting restrictions on
speech is appropriate); see, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 634-35 (1982) (arguing that the distinction between commercial and other forms of
expression is unjustified beyond the regulation of false and misleading advertising).
5. See Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 1223-24.
6. Id. at 1260-61.
7. See, e.g., id. at 1217; see also STEVEN H. SHIFFRN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE
MEANINGS OF AMERICA 41 (Princeton Univ. Press 1999) (faulting the Court's commercial
speech jurisprudence for failing "to make a distinction between commercial information and
commercial advertising"). Professor Shiffrin suggests that commercial advertisers "deserve some
free speech protection, but no special protection." Id. at xii.
8. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 1224.
260
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"anti-protectionists"--contend that providing any First Amendment
protection to commercial speech, even the less-than-complete
protection afforded by the doctrine, risks weakening the First
Amendment's core value of providing ample breathing room for
personal political, social, and artistic expression.' For these
commentators, equating detergent ads by profit-seeking corporations
with core political speech by individuals inevitably dilutes the
protection afforded to speech that lies at the heart of the First
Amendment. "o
Professor Shiffrin rejects the anti-protectionist approach as well.
As he sees it, much of what is labeled commercial speech deserves
First Amendment protection because it does in fact implicate core
political or social values." Simply tarring speech with a
"4commercial" label to avoid wrestling with difficult questions about
the nature of the speech and the speech's role in political and social
discourse is, in Professor Shiffrin's view, itself an affront to the First
Amendment. 2
Ever the iconoclast, Professor Shiffrin carves out his own path
in the commercial speech debate, rejecting general theories as
formulaic, rigid, imprecise, and ultimately unhelpful. Professor
Shiffrin instead calls for a careful, highly context-sensitive, case-by-
case balancing of interests when government seeks to regulate
speech relating to economic activity. 3 He has little tolerance for
paternalistic government regulation and believes the courts should
exercise probing and skeptical review of government justifications
for speech regulation. 4 But, as his later writings drive home, he is
also deeply suspicious of concentrated corporate power, and the
ability of large, unchecked, corporate interests to monopolize debate
on important issues. 5 He diverges from pro-protectionist First
9. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) ("[A] complete denial of first amendment protection for commercial
speech is not only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment theory.").
10. Id.
11. See Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 1238-39.
12. Id. at 1241-52.
13. Id. at 1251-52.
14. Id. at 1223.
15. Professor Shiffrin's more recent writings focus on a dissent-informed conception of the
First Amendment and suggest that the exercise of corporate power often goes unchecked and is
often enabled by government. SHIFFRIN, supra note 7, at 37-43, 93, 107-09.
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Amendment theorists by acknowledging that, at times, the
government's interest in regulating speech relating to economic
activity extends beyond restraining speech that is demonstrably false,
misleading, or deceptive.'6  In Professor Shiffrin's view, the
government's interest in regulating even truthful speech is, at times,
sufficiently substantial such that the government's interest should
prevail.17
In the introduction to Away from a General Theory, Professor
Shiffrin summarizes his mission in this way:
I offer neither a bold new methodology, nor any creative
"solution" to the commercial speech problem here. It is
precisely because the problem is so difficult that both courts
and commentators have been groping to find their way. If I
have a contribution to make, it is to show why this
difficulty exists, why the commercial speech problem is in
fact many problems, and why the small questions will not
go away.'"
This essay takes as its starting point Professor Shiffrin's
observation that "the commercial speech problem is in fact many
problems."' 9 It focuses on commercial speech problems that bedevil
First Amendment theorists and the courts alike: what constitutional
protections should be afforded to speech promoting a product that
poses significant risks to the product's users and does so by making
health or safety claims that omit information about the product's
risks or are not susceptible to empirical verification?
This is not an idle question. Consider one example. There has
already been substantial litigation over Congress's efforts to prohibit
dietary supplement manufacturers and food purveyors from
disseminating ads that claim that their products cure, treat, or
mitigate a disease where there is no significant scientific agreement
that the claim is true.2" The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act'
16. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 1260-61.
17. Id. at 1260-61 (stating that values other than freedom of speech can cause the
government to restrict speech); see also id. at 1214-15 (listing various forms of accepted
government regulation of presumably truthful commercial speech).
18. Id. at 1216.
19. Id.
20. These claims include: "omega-3 fatty acids reduce the risk of heart disease," "vitamin C
reduces the risk of influenza," "SAM-e [a dietary supplement] treats depression and arthritis."
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requires "significant scientific agreement" before such claims can be
made." But sellers frequently make claims about their products that,
because the scientific evidence is not definitive, cannot be proven
true or false. The statute forbids sellers from making these claims,
but they have objected on First Amendment grounds. To avoid First
Amendment difficulties, lower courts have refused to read the statute
literally, ruling instead that the government, not the seller, bears the
burden on the question of "truth."23 Where the government cannot
prove falsity, the government may require that sellers use disclaimers
to counter consumer confusion.24 The government may resort to
more stringent regulation or prohibition only if it can prove that
disclaimers would "bewilder" consumers.25
To bring this discussion into focus, this essay concentrates on a
question of exceptional importance-as yet unexplored by the
courts-that is before Congress as of this writing and is likely to fuel
the commercial speech debate: whether direct-to-consumer ("DTC")
advertising of prescription drugs should be permitted, and if so,
See David C. Vladeck, Devaluing Truth: Unverified Health Claims in the Aftermath of Pearson v.
Shalala, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 535, 542 (1999).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2000).
22. For health claims regarding foods, the Act says that they may be made
only if the Secretary determines, based on the totality of publicly available scientific
evidence (including evidence from well-designed studies conducted in a manner which
is consistent with generally recognized scientific procedures and principles), that there
is significant scientific agreement, among experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate such claims, that the claim is supported by such evidence.
Id. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i). Congress did not specify a standard for health claims for dietary
supplements, but instead directed the FDA to set a standard "respecting the validity of such
claim[s]." Id. § 343(r)(5)(D). The FDA by regulation adopted the "significant scientific
agreement" standard for health claims for dietary supplements. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.14(c),
101.70(f)(B).
23. See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the FDA must
explain what it means by "significant scientific agreement"). Cf Whitaker v. Thompson, 239 F.
Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2003), affd, 353 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding FDA's rejection of
health claim for saw palmetto, a dietary supplement).
24. See, e.g., Pearson, 164 F.3d at 658-59.
25. Id. at 659-60. See generally Vladeck, supra note 20, (criticizing Pearson). To avoid
further litigation, the FDA has established a procedure to permit sellers of foods and dietary
supplements to make "qualified" health claims-that is, health claims that do not meet the
"significant scientific agreement" standard set out in the statute-but are "qualified" by a
disclaimer. See 68 Fed. Reg. 41, 387 (2003); see also CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED
NUTRITION, FDA, FINAL GUIDANCE: FDA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF "QUALIFIED HEALTH CLAIMS"
(May 12, 2006), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/qhcqagui.html.
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whether these ads should be subject to any limits? 26  How one
answers these questions-the "small questions" that Professor
Shiffrin says will not go away--depends on one's conception of the
role the First Amendment plays in the regulation of economic
activity. For instance, does it matter that consumers may not
purchase these products on their own, but instead must have a doctor
prescribe the drug for them? Does it matter that evaluating the risks
and benefits of prescription medication is a task fraught with
complexity and generally beyond the competence of consumers?
Does it matter that empirical evidence suggests that DTC ads are
highly effective in influencing consumer choice but often fail to
disclose adequately the risks of the drug? Does it matter that the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") lacks the statutory tools and
resources to police the DTC advertising marketplace effectively?
Let us now turn to the "commercial speech problem" and see
whether, as Professor Shiffrin claims, the "small questions" it raises
will not go away.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
To set the stage, it is useful to recall the evolution of the modem
commercial speech doctrine. The basic story is a familiar one. Prior
to the Supreme Court's landmark 1976 ruling in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,27
"commercial speech" was generally not entitled to protection under
the First Amendment.
The key case was Valentine v. Chrestensen.5 In 1940, Mr.
Chrestensen sailed into the New York harbor in a "former U.S. Navy
Submarine S-49," a two-million-dollar "fighting monster," intending
to put the submarine on public display. 9 Mr. Chrestensen distributed
handbills offering tours of the submarine for a fee. But New York's
anti-littering ordinance prohibited the distribution of handbills for the
purpose of "commercial and business advertising," and the police
26. Congress is considering a substantial overhaul of our nation's drug safety laws, and
direct-to-consumer ads are squarely in Congress's sights. See Food and Drug Administration
Revitalization Act, S.1082, 110th Cong. § 202 (as passed by Senate, May 9, 2007); Enhancing
Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007, H.R. 1561, 110th Cong. (as introduced in House, Mar.
19, 2007). At this writing, it does not appear that Congress will restrict DTC ads.
27. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
28. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
29. Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 512 (2d Cir. 1941).
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ordered Mr. Chrestensen to desist.3" Undeterred, Mr. Chrestensen
resurfaced with a new, two-sided handbill. One side advertised tours
of his submarine. The other detailed Mr. Chrestensen's complaint
against the city for denying him permission to moor his submarine at
a city dock convenient to visitors. Unpersuaded that the
modification changed the commercial nature of the handbill, the
police again ordered Mr. Chrestensen to stop distribution. Mr.
Chrestensen brought suit. After a short-lived victory in the Second
Circuit, his case came before the Supreme Court, which scuttled his
promotional efforts once and for all.
To call Justice Robert's opinion for the unanimous Court
perfunctory is an overstatement. The 875 word opinion (125 of
which quote the relevant provision of the New York City anti-
littering law) contains not a single case citation and nothing
approaching analysis. It simply announces that "the Constitution
imposes no ... restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising" and chastises Mr. Chrestensen for
attempting to evade the ordinance by merging his political attack on
the City with his commercial appeal.3' Justice Roberts said, "If that
evasion were successful every merchant who desires to broadcast
advertising leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or
a moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the law's command."32
The rule of Valentine v. Chrestensen, that speech proposing a
commercial transaction receives no constitutional protection, stood
essentially unchallenged for three decades. Although the opinion
was, at times, criticized by individual Justices as "casual, almost
offhand,"33 it was not until the Court's 1975 ruling in Bigelow v.
Virginia34 that it became clear that Valentine's days were numbered.
Bigelow was decided in the wake of Roe v. Wade.3 5 Bigelow held
that a state could not forbid advertising for abortion services,
30. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53 n.1.
31. Id. at 54.
32. Id. at 55.
33. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 629 nn.4-8 (1990) (cataloguing criticisms of Valentine); see also Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 401 & n.6 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id.
at 404 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (observing that Valentine "has not survived reflection").
34. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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signaling the Court's view that Valentine was a "limited" ruling that
"obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that
advertising is unprotected per se."36
The following year marked the birth of the modem commercial
speech doctrine. It bears noting that several of the pivotal
commercial speech cases involved speech restrictions incidental to
the regulation of drugs. Virginia Board of Pharmacy37 struck down a
Virginia law forbidding pharmacists from advertising the price of
prescription drugs. The Court held explicitly, for the first time, that
speech proposing a commercial transaction is entitled to some
measure of constitutional protection.38 The Court observed that the
"consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information...
may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's
most urgent political debate," and thus society has "a strong interest
in the free flow of commercial information."39  And it found the
Virginia statute to be "highly paternalistic."4 But the Court did not
articulate a standard for assessing restraints on commercial speech,
but instead, in a Delphic footnote, left the question of how much
protection such speech deserves for another day.41
For our purposes, what is significant about the Court's opinion
in Virginia Board of Pharmacy is not just the Court's path-breaking
holding, but also the dissent by then-Justice Rehnquist. Aligning
himself with the anti-protectionist camp, Justice Rehnquist rejected
the Court's view that commercial expression falls within the
protective sphere of the First Amendment. Instead, he argued that
the First Amendment's purpose is to enlighten "public decision
making as to political, social, and other public issues," not "the
decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or
another kind of shampoo."42 With remarkable foresight, Justice
Rehnquist predicted that the Court's ruling would pave the way to
DTC advertising of prescription drugs, and he forecast that an
36. 421 U.S. at 819-20 (emphasis omitted).
37. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
38. Id. at 770.
39. Id. at 763-64.
40. Id. at 770.
41. Id. at 771 n.24 ("suggest[ing] that a different degree of protection" should be afforded to
commercial speech).
42. Id. at 787.
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enterprising pharmacy might soon run an advertisement that said
"Don't spend another sleepless night. Ask your doctor to prescribe
Seconal [a powerful prescription sleeping medication] without
delay."43  Justice Rehnquist warned that ads like these were an
inevitable consequence of the majority opinion:
Unless the State can show that these advertisements are
either actually untruthful or misleading, it presumably is not
free to restrict in any way commercial efforts on the part of
those who profit from the sale of prescription drugs to put
them in the widest possible circulation. But such a line
simply makes no allowance whatever for ... a considered
legislative judgment in most States that while prescription
drugs are a necessary and vital part of medical care and
treatment, there are sufficient dangers attending their
widespread use that they simply may not be promoted in the
same manner as hair creams, deodorants, and toothpaste."
The question raised by DTC advertising is precisely Justice
Rehnquist's question: i.e., does the First Amendment make an
allowance for a legislative judgment that prescription drugs, "a
necessary and vital part of medical care," not be "promoted in the
same manner as hair creams, deodorants, and toothpaste"?
45
Four years after Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court handed
down its decision in Central Hudson,46 which established the now-
familiar four part test for evaluating the constitutionality of
restrictions on commercial speech. The test inquires whether:
(1) The speech is false or misleading, or concerns an
unlawful activity, such that it may be suppressed outright;
(2) The asserted governmental interest is substantial;
(3) The regulation directly advances the asserted
governmental interest; and
(4) The regulation is more extensive than necessary.47
43. Id. at 788.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
47. Id. at 566. Even before the ink was dry on Central Hudson, it was subject to extensive
criticism, from both within the Court and the academic community. Justice Powell's majority
opinion mustered the support of only five Justices: Justice Blackmun, the author of Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, complained that "the test now evolved and applied by the Court is not
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As I have explained elsewhere, although the Court has never
formally abandoned Central Hudson, it has slowly transformed the
test without explicitly doing so.48 As initially articulated, the Central
Hudson test was a genuinely intermediate standard of scrutiny, with
courts giving legislative judgments considerable deference.4 9 The
theory, of course, was that commercial speech merits constitutional
protection to enable consumers to get information they need to make
informed choices." Consumers are only interested in truthful
information; false, misleading, deceptive, or unreliable information
subverts the interest in informed decision making. The theory did
not seek to advance the expressive interests of the speaker; indeed,
the early cases are remarkably devoid of any mention of the
speaker's interest." Applying the Central Hudson test as first
formulated, the Court upheld a number of laws that restrained
commercial speech: the Court thought that the restraints served
sufficiently strong governmental interests and did not needlessly
intrude on protected speech." In more recent cases, however, the
Court has tightened the standard considerably. No longer do courts
consistent with our prior cases and does not provide adequate protection for truthful, non-
misleading, noncoercive commercial speech." Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In an
opinion that fits well with Professor Shiffrin's theory, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's
efforts to formulate a one-size-fits-all test was misguided and that the speech at issue in Central
Hudson-the utility's promotion of off-peak pricing-concerned important economic matters and
thus was entitled to rigorous First Amendment protection. Id. at 579-81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
And Justice Rehnquist again dissented, arguing against constitutionalizing speech unrelated to
social and political discourse. He accused the Court of"return[ing] to the bygone era of Lochner
v. New York, in which it was common practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations
adopted by a State based on the Court's own notions of the most appropriate means for the State
to implement its considered policies." Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Typical of the academic criticism of Central Hudson is Professor Robert Post's, who called the
test "so vague and abstract as to fail entirely to express any specific constitutional values."
Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000); see
also Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism and Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1317, 1374-77(1988).
48. See generally David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky
Reconsidered, 54 CAS. W. RES. L. REv. 1049 (2004); see, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v.
Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
49. Vladeck, supra note 48, at 1055.
50. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial
speech is based on the informational function of advertising.") (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Belloti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
51. See Vladeck, supra note 48, at 1070 n.92 (and authorities cited therein); see, e.g., First
Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 779-80 (1978).
52. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); United States v. Edge Broad.
Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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give deference to legislative judgments or uphold restraints that are
reasonable and proportionate to the interests they serve." Rather, the
test applied today is a demanding one-akin to strict scrutiny-that
results in the virtually automatic invalidation of laws restraining
commercial speech that is not demonstrably false, misleading or
deceptive.54
III. DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING
Just as Justice Rehnquist predicted, Virginia Board of Pharmacy
unleashed a wave of DTC advertising for prescription medications.
These days, DTC advertising for drugs designed to treat ailments
ranging from insomnia, anxiety, hair loss, and high blood pressure to
sexual dysfunction and arthritis, is a standard feature on all media,
but increasingly on television.5 Drug companies often launch mass
marketing campaigns for their drugs as soon as they obtain FDA
approval. Drug companies now spend over $29 billion annually to
promote their products,56 including $11.4 billion on advertising.
Nearly forty percent of the advertising expenditures-over $4 billion
per year-pay for DTC ads that are designed to encourage patients to
ask their doctors to prescribe the advertised drug." As a result, the
53. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371-74 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555-64 (2001).
54. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 373-74 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. 525 (2001). But
see Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007) (upholding
restraint on in-person recruitment of high school athletes).
55. From 1997 to 2001, the percentage of DTC advertising for print ads declined from 74 to
35, while the percentage of spending on television ads increased from 25 to 64. Government
Accounting Office, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 10 (GAO-03-177) (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter 2002 GAO REPORT].
For a history of the FDA's regulation of DTC ads, see Timothy S. Hall, The Promise and Peril of
Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
1 (2003).
56. Julie M. Donohue, et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription
Drugs, 357 JAMA 673 (Aug. 16, 2007).
57. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 2 (May 2007), available at
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057_06.pdf.
58. A 2005 study found that $4.2 billion was spent on DTC advertising annually, or 37
percent of total pharmaceutical advertising. Id. To put these expenditures in context, the
pharmaceutical industry now spends nearly as much money on advertising as the tobacco industry
spends on all of its product promotion (including price reductions and samples). Cf FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION CIGARETTE REPORT FOR 2003 2 (2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
cigarette05/050809cigrpt.pdf (reporting that the tobacco industry spent a total of $15.15 billion in
2003 to promote its products).
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average American now views "as many as 16 hours of prescription
drug advertisements per year, far exceeding the average time spent
with a primary care physician.
59
DTC advertising is highly targeted. Indeed, "[a]lmost all
spending on DTC advertising is concentrated among a small number
of drugs that treat chronic conditions and therefore must be taken
repeatedly."6 According to the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), "in 2005, the top 20 DTC advertised drugs accounted for
more than 50 percent of all spending on DTC advertising"6'-a total
of more than $2 billion devoted to advertising 20 drug products.
DTC advertising has proven to be highly successful in
stimulating demand for drugs. An assessment by the National
Institute for Health Care Management found that between 1999 and
2000, the number of prescriptions written for the 50 most advertised
drugs rose 24 percent, as compared to a 4 percent increase in
prescriptions for all other drugs, although this study did not take into
account the likelihood that these drugs were also heavily promoted to
doctors.62 A patient who requests a specific medication is more
likely to receive medication-and the particular drug requested-
than a patient who does not ask for a specific drug, even when the
two present the same symptoms. 63 According to an FDA study,
between 74 and 77 percent of doctors prescribed the requested drug
when a specific drug was requested. 64 The same study reported that
59. Dominick F. Frosch et al., Creating Demand for Prescription Drugs: A Content Analysis
of Television Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 5 ANNALS OF FAM. MED. 6, 6 (2007) (citing Erica
D. Brownfield et al., Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertisements on Network Television: An
Exploration of Quantity, Frequency, and Placement, 9 J. HEALTH COMM. 491, 496 (2004)).
60. 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 12; see also Government Accountability Office,
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA'S OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER ADVERTISING 14 (GAO-07-54) (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter Nov. 2006 GAO REPORT].
61. NOv. 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 14.
62. Id.; see also 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 16 ("surveys... consistently show
that DTC advertisements have an impact on whether consumers request and receive a specific
brand-name prescription").
63. Richard L. Kravitz, Influence of Patients' Requests for Direct-to-Consumer Advertised
Antidepressants, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1995, 1999 (2005) (reporting results of randomized trial
in which actors were sent to doctor's offices presenting symptoms of depression. Those who
asked for a specific antidepressant were more likely to get medication than those who did not, and
were likely to get a prescription for the requested medication).
64. K. Aiken, et al., Patient and Physician Attitudes and Behaviors Associated with DTC
Promotion of Prescription Drugs-Summary of FDA Results, 7 (Nov. 19, 2004) available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/Fina%20Report/DTCPhysicianSurvey%20Materialsb3.pdf (last
viewed on Oct. 4, 2007).
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65 percent of physicians believe patients misunderstand the relative
risks and benefits of DTC advertised drugs and 75 percent say that
the ads cause patients to overestimate the drug's benefits.65 In 2006,
the Government Accountability Office reported that its review of
many studies showed that "about 90 percent of consumers report
having seen a DTC advertisement," and that between 2 and 7 percent
of consumers who have seen DTC ads say that they requested and
received a prescription for the advertised drug from their physician.66
Based on "[s]urveys conducted by the FDA and private
organizations," the GAO concluded that DTC advertisements "have
an impact on whether consumers request and receive a specific
brand-name prescription from their physician.
67
The FDA also has problems regulating the content of these ads.6"
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not directly address DTC
advertising. The FDA derives its authority to regulate prescription
drug advertising from its general responsibility to regulate written or
graphic materials that accompany a regulated product.69  Ads must
contain "information in brief summary relating to side effects,
contraindications... and effectiveness" (the "brief summary"
requirement).7" For broadcast advertising, the company must state
the drug's major risks and either provide a "brief summary" or make
"adequate provision.., for dissemination of the approved or
permitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast
65. Id. at 8.
66. Nov. 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 14-15.
67. 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 16; see also Nov. 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note
60, at 14. The Institute of Medicine has reached a similar conclusion. It reports that DTC
"advertising may lead to more rapid uptake of a new drug... which could potentially
dramatically increase the exposure to that particular drug, even among patients who are not good
candidates for it." Inst. of Medicine, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC, 158 (Nat'l Academies Press 2006). Available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid- 11750#toc. [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
68. See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 23 ("[R]eviews of draft regulatory letters from
FDA have taken so long that misleading advertisements may have completed their broadcast life
cycle before FDA issued the letters.").
69. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2000); see also Direct-to-Consumer Promotion; Public hearing, 60
Fed. Reg. 42,581 (Aug. 16, 1995) (FDA Notice of Public Hearing to discuss regulation of DTC
advertising and brief explanation of the FDA's policies regarding DTC ads); FDA, DIVISION OF
DRUG MARKETING, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST
ADVERTISEMENTS (Aug. 9, 1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/advrts.pdf.
70. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e)(1) (2007).
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presentation." t "Reminder" ads, which can disclose the name of the
drug but not its indication, do not have to include risk information.72
Drug ads most frequently run afoul of FDA regulations for DTC
advertising in two situations: the ad either fails to give adequate
safety information about a drug; or the ad overstates the effectiveness
of the drug, often by claiming incorrectly that the drug compares
favorably with other drugs in the same class.73 In either case,
consumers receive messages about a drug that are false or misleading
and designed to stimulate demand for the drug.
The FDA has only a limited ability to police the DTC
advertising market. Drug companies have no legal duty to submit
ads to the FDA prior to dissemination. Rather, FDA regulations
require companies to submit advertising materials to the agency
when the ad is first aired.74 Some manufacturers neglect to submit
ads at all, apparently hoping that the FDA will not catch them.75
Even when companies submit their advertising materials when an ad
is first aired, the FDA lacks the personnel and resources to review all
of the thousands of advertisements it receives. And this problem has
intensified as the number of DTC ads continues to increase.76 Indeed,
the FDA has admitted that it cannot review DTC ads in a timely way,
71. Id.
72. 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 8. Several companies have encountered problems
with the FDA over these reminder ads, however. The manufacturer of the nasal allergy drug
Flonase received a regulatory letter from the FDA in 1999 after it aired an advertisement that did
not directly state the indication of the drug. Rather, the ad showed "a person in an environment
that contains allergens, such as flowers, grasses, and trees, and then show[ed] the person taking a
deep breath." See Letter from FDA to Glaxo Welcome (Sept. 17, 1999),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/sep99/wl091799.pdf.
73. 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 55 at 20 tbl.4.
74. Id.
75. For instance, in 1998 and 1999, the makers of Flonase, a nasal spray for relief from
allergy symptoms, aired a commercial in Puerto Rico that was never submitted to the FDA and
contained "no risk information at all." See Warning Letter from FDA to Glaxo Wellcome
(August 18, 1999), http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/aug99/w1081899.pdf. Once the FDA learned
of the ad, it sent a warning letter to the manufacturer in August 1999. This was not an isolated
occurrence. In recent years, the FDA has had to issue a number of warning letters to companies
that have failed to submit advertising material to the FDA. See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note
55, at 20 tbl.4.
76. See Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce H.R., 107th Cong. 10 (2002)
(responses of the Food and Drug Administration for the record). In its 2006 report, the GAO
found that the DTC Review Group at the FDA suffered from under-staffing and was not equipped
to handle the 4,600 final DTC materials in received in 2005. NOv. 2006 GAO REPORT, supra
note 60, at 17-19.
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and has estimated that it would need to nearly double the number of
reviewers it has on staff just to keep pace with DTC ads."
The FDA's problems extend beyond resource limitations. The
agency has only limited authority to sanction companies for false or
misleading ads. The FDA has no statutory authority to impose civil
penalties for misleading ads, and the only real sanction it has (apart
from bringing a misbranding action in court) is to issue public
warning letters that detail the violation and threaten legal action if
the violation is not rectified.7 ' But the process of issuing warning
letters has fallen victim to internal FDA politics. As a result of a
2002 policy change, all regulatory letters now have to be reviewed
by the FDA's Office of Chief Counsel.7 ' The change has had two
consequences. One is that the number of warning letters has dropped
markedly. According to the GAO, "[s]ince the policy change, FDA
has issued fewer regulatory letters per year than it did in any year
prior to the change.""° From 1997 to 2001, the FDA issued 15 to 25
letters per year related to DTC ads; from 2002 to 2005, only 8 to 11
letters were issued per year.8' The second, and perhaps more
problematic, consequence is delay. In 2002, the GAO raised
questions about the speed with which regulatory letters were being
processed. s2 Although the FDA promised reform, the process is still
mired in delay.83 Between 2002 and 2005, it took an average of 4
months for the FDA to issue a regulatory letter; prior to the policy
77. Id. Legislation currently before Congress would ameliorate this problem. In provisions
reauthorizing the FDA's "user fee" program, in which drug companies pay a fee to defray the cost
of the FDA reviewing applications for new drugs, Congress has proposed giving companies the
right to pay a new user fee to have the FDA review an ad before it is aired. The pending
legislation would also give the FDA new authority, including the ability to impose civil money
payments, for certain violations of the Act, including those involving drug promotion. See
generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FDA LEGISLATION IN
THE I l01T CONGRESS: A GUIDE TO S.1082 AND H.R. 2900 (July 18, 2007).
78. On occasion, the FDA directs companies to issue "corrective advertising materials." But
the FDA has little control of the timing of corrective ads, and there is generally a lengthy delay.
In one example cited by the GAO, the FDA found an ad that had run from April through October
2004 to be in violation of the Act. The FDA issued a letter in April 2005 requiring the company
to correct the misleading ad. But the company did not issue the corrective ad until January 2006.
Nov. 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 31.
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id. at3.
83. Id. (discussing GAO recommendations for reform and resulting FDA goals).
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change, issuing a letter took about two weeks. 4  As a result,
misleading ads remain on the air for extended periods of time, and
the FDA often sends out warning letters after an advertising
campaign has run its course. 5
DTC ads have been identified as a key culprit in several serious
recent public health debacles, most notably with Vioxx and
Celebrex 6 These drugs belong to a class of drugs known as "COX-
2 inhibitors."87 They were developed as part of a new generation of
pain relievers for patients with arthritis and rheumatism, equally
effective as older painkillers like ibuprofen in blocking pain, but with
less risk of gastrointestinal bleeding.88 Recognizing that these drugs
might mark a significant therapeutic advance, the FDA accelerated
its approval of them, with approvals for Celebrex and Vioxx coming
in 1998 and 1999, respectively.89 COX-2 drugs were not marketed
simply as improved versions of older treatments. Instead, they were
marketed as entirely new drugs that were more effective, lower-risk
treatments for pain and inflammation associated with common
ailments, ranging from mild muscle aches to arthritis. As has now
been shown, not only were these claims overstated, but the drugs
also increase a patient's risk of heart attack and stroke, especially
when used for extended periods. Because of these risks, Vioxx was
84. Id. at 21, 28. One congressional study found that in 2003 it took the FDA an average of
177 days from initial placement of a prescription drug advertisement to an enforcement action, if
any. MINORITY STAFF OF U.S. H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, FDA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
AGAINST FALSE AND MISLEADING PRESCRIPTION DRUG ADVERTISEMENTS DECLINED IN 2003 4
(2004), available at http://drugsafetyresearch.com/downloads.HouseDemRept.
Advertising.pdf.
85. NOv. 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 28. One signal that the FDA's oversight is
not an effective deterrent is the fact that "FDA regulatory letters do not always prevent the same
drug companies from later disseminating violative DTC materials for the same drug, sometimes
using the same or similar claims" the FDA had previously found misleading. Id. at 31. Of the 89
drugs for which the FDA sent regulatory letters between 1997 and 2005, 25 drugs had DTC
advertising materials that were cited in more than one letter. Id.
86. See generally Barry Meier et al., Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble for
Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at Al.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Drugs that are approved on an accelerated basis are cleared by the FDA with less safety
and efficacy information than other drugs, and there is a greater chance that unforeseen risks will
emerge as the drug is used in larger populations for longer durations. See GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA'S POSTMARKET
DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS (GAO-06-402) 11 (Mar. 2006), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf.
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withdrawn from the market in 2004 and warnings were added to alert
patients using Celebrex of the drug's cardiovascular risks.9"
As soon as the drugs were approved by the FDA, they were
heavily promoted directly to patients as safer and more effective
substitutes for the older generation of anti-inflammatory drugs.9"
Merck, for example, trumpeted the FDA's approval of Vioxx with
what the company proclaimed to be its biggest, fastest, and best
launch ever.92 In 2000, just its second year on the market, Vioxx was
the number one DTC-advertised drug-$160 million for DTC ads,93
more than spent that year to advertise Budweiser or Pepsi-and retail
sales quadrupled.94 Until 2002, the ads made no mention of an
increased risk of heart attack or stroke.95 In the first nine months of
2004, Pfizer spent over $71 million on DTC ads for Celebrex, even
though doubts about the safety of the drug had already begun to
emerge.96
These ads were highly successful. After just a year on the
market, the COX-2 drugs (mainly Vioxx and Celebrex) had captured
about 40 percent of the market from traditional anti-inflammatory
drugs, despite costing an average of two to three dollars per pill,
while the older generation anti-inflammatory drugs cost just a few
pennies each.97 More than 19 million prescriptions for Celebrex
90. Both companies are now embroiled in extensive product liability litigation over these
risks. See, e.g., Bloomberg News Service, Vioxx Damage Award, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2007, at
C8, available at http://nytimes.com/2007/06/06/business/06vioxx.html?ex=1338782400&en
=be8ff02278a25d25&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (estimating that Merck faces over
27,000 lawsuits over Vioxx).
91. See Meier, supra note 86, at 1.
92. See Robert Langreth, Merck's Vioxx Arthiritis Drug Gets Approval, WALL ST. J., May
24, 1999, at B3.
93. THE EUROPEAN CONSUMERS ORGANISATION, CONSUMERS SAY NO TO UNETHICAL
DRUG PROMOTIONS 4 (2006).
94. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND
MASS MEDIA ADVERTISING, 2000 5 (2001), available at http://www.nihcm.org/-nihcmor/pdf/
DTCbrief2001 .pdf.
95. The FDA warned Merck in 2001 that its advertising campaign for Vioxx (including DTC
ads) improperly minimized the risks of heart attack and stroke. After protracted negotiations
between the FDA and Merck, the agency in 2002 required Merck to add warnings about heart
attack and stroke to Vioxx's labeling. See Barry Meier, For Merck, Defense of a Drug Crumbles
at a Difficult Time, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at C 1.
96. Meier, supra note 86, at I.
97. Id. at 38.
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were written its first year on the market.9" An estimated 105 million
prescriptions were written for Vioxx in the United States between
May 20, 1999 and September 30, 2004, involving 20 million
patients.99 At the height of their sales, Celebrex brought in about
$3.3 billion a year for Pfizer and Vioxx brought in over $2.5 billion
for Merck.'°
According to medical experts, the effect of the DTC advertising
was "to drive consumer demand for COX-2 drugs far beyond the
bulk of those patients who really benefit from them."'0 ' Use of
Vioxx and Celebrex extended well beyond what could be justified
medically.0 2  And, the experts contend, the problem is not one
limited to the COX-2 market. "Too often, marketing can drown out
medical science" because "the lure of the new drug can run ahead of
the science." ''"3 As The New York Times put it, the COX-2 example
is "perhaps the clearest instance yet of how the confluence of
medicine and marketing can turn hope into hype."'0 4
IV. THE SMALL ARGUMENTS THAT WILL NOT Go AWAY
There have been a number of proposals by Congress to limit
DTC advertising or to ban it outright.0 5 I will not try to canvass all
of those efforts here. Instead, I will focus only on two proposals,
each of which has recently received serious consideration by
Congress. The first would give the FDA authority to require
disclaimers on DTC ads and, in some cases, impose a two-year
moratorium on DTC advertising for specific, potentially high-risk
98. Diedtra Henderson, How Safe Is Celebrex?, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 2007 at DI
available at http://www.boston.com/yourlife/health/diseases/articles/2007/0
2 /2 5/how-safe-is
_celebrex/.
99. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48367 (E.D. La. July 3, 2007).
100. Meier, supra note 86, at 1.
101. Id. atA38.
102. Id. ("A big problem with COX-2 drugs ... has been the tendency of doctors to use them
indiscriminately") (quoting Dr. Guerkipal Singh).
103. Id. (quoting Dr. James F. Fries, Director, Stanford Arthritis Group); see also NOV. 2006
GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 16-17.
104. Meier, supra note 86, at Al.
105. Some of the pre-2002 proposals are addressed in Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel
Mullins, The Development of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising Regulation, 57
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 423, 434-36 (2002).
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drugs." 6 The second would ban outright all DTC advertising in
broadcast media.10 7
Both proposals reflect a deep-seated concern that DTC
advertising artificially creates demand for drugs that may pose
special dangers to consumers. The underlying worry is that the
FDA's testing and evaluation of drugs prior to approval is based on
clinical studies that are conducted over relatively brief periods of
time-maybe a year or so-and involve small groups-at most a few
thousand-of relatively homogenous patients. Pre-approval testing
generally is incapable of detecting adverse effects that occur
infrequently, have long latency periods, or affect sub-populations not
included or adequately represented in the studies (e.g., the elderly,
ethnic minorities, and pregnant women).0 8 For these reasons, the
FDA's approval of a drug is not a warrant that the drug will not
cause serious adverse effects even if used for its intended purposes.
And experience shows that many unforeseen risks emerge in the first
year or so that a drug is marketed for general use.0 9 To proponents
of the efforts to restrict DTC advertising, Vioxx and Celebrex are the
poster children for these dangers."0
A. The First Proposal
The first proposal, floated by Senator Kennedy during
Congress's recent debates on pending drug safety legislation, was
designed to clarify and expand the FDA's regulatory authority over
DTC advertising."' Under the proposal, the FDA would be
106. See discussion infra Part III.A.
107. See discussion infra Part III.B.
108. IOM REPORT, supra note 67, at 38.
109. See generally David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the
FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008); see also IOM
REPORT, supra note 67, at 38; Bruce M. Psaty & Curt D. Furberg, COX-2 Inhibitors-Lessons in
Drug Safety, 352 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1133, 1134 (2005) ("In the initial evaluation of the COX-2
inhibitors [the class of drugs that includes Vioxx and Celebrex] the use of small, short-term trials,
the exclusion of high-risk patients, and the methodogical inattention to cardiovascular events all
minimized the possibility of uncovering evidence of cardiovascular harm.)"
110. They are not, however, the only examples. More recently, the FDA came under fire for
taking a year to require the manufacturers of two widely sold diabetes drugs, Avania and Actos,
to carry prominent "black box" warnings for the risk of heart attack. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris,
F.D.A. Issues Strictest Warning on Diabetes Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2007, at Al; Gardiner
Harris, Potentially Incompatible Goals at F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2007, at Al.
11l. The proposal is based on an amendment to S. 1082, 1 10th Cong., offered by Senator
Kennedy, that was taken out of the bill during mark-up by the Senate Committee on Health,
Education and Labor. Senator Kennedy's proposal, in turn, was an effort to build upon the
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authorized to "pre-review" DTC ads. 12 If accepted, the FDA would
have to complete its review within forty-five days." 3
The proposal would then empower the FDA to regulate DTC
advertising in situations where the proposed advertising lacks a
specific disclosure of when the drug was approved and an
acknowledgment that existing information "may not have identified
or allowed for full assessment of all serious risks" relating to the
drug."4 This disclosure would respond directly to the concern that
consumers may be unaware that pre-approval testing of new drugs is
no guarantee that adverse effects will not emerge once the drug has
been used in larger patient populations for a year or more."5 For that
reason, the proposal authorizes the FDA to direct that DTC
advertisements contain disclaimers alerting consumers that the drug
has only recently been approved by the FDA and thus the products'
risk profile is still uncertain. In the exceptional case where the FDA
determines that the disclaimers would not, on their own, be adequate
"to protect public health and safety," and that "additional information
about serious risks" needs to be compiled, the proposal would give
the FDA the power to prohibit DTC ads for the drug for a fixed
period not to exceed two years." 6 In exercising that power, the FDA
would have to consider a host of factors, including a patient's ability
to obtain substitute products and the "extent to which clinical trials
used to approve the drug may not have identified serious risks that
might occur among patients expected to be treated with the drug."' ' 7
The question is whether such a proposal, if enacted into law,
would survive First Amendment review.' Let me start with the
recommendation of the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine that, in widely
publicized 2006 report, urged Congress to impose a two year ban on DTC advertising for all new
drugs. See IOM REPORT, supra note 67, at 158.
112. Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act, S. 1082, 110th Cong. § 202(5)(O)(N)
(2005).
113. Id.
114. Id. at § 202(4)(G)(i).
115. See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 109, at 471.
116. S. 1082, 110th Cong. § 202 (o)(5)(F) (as reported by Sen. Kennedy, Apr. 24, 2007.
117. Id. at § 202 (o)(5)(F)(v).
118. I will put to the side any claim that the First Amendment would bar Congress from
giving the FDA the power to "prereview" DTC ads for new drugs. Courts have rejected the
argument that the prior restraint doctrine applies in the commercial speech context. E.g., Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (finding prior restraint doctrine "inapplicable" to
commercial speech). And the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act already gives the agency ample
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basic arguments in favor of its constitutionality, and then I will
sketch out the arguments against."9
1. Arguments Supporting Constitutionality
The first and most powerful argument in favor of the first
proposal is the core public health justification Congress would
invoke in enacting it-namely, that DTC advertising of prescription
drugs artificially and improperly stimulates demand for drugs that,
by definition, pose a serious health threat to patients. That risk
greatly increases with newly approved drugs whose safety profiles
are uncertain. 2 ' As noted above, there is substantial empirical
evidence underlying Congress's determinations that DTC ads pose a
real threat to the public health, and that disclaimers or the temporary
elimination of DTC advertising for specific high-risk drugs would
materially advance the government's interest in safeguarding
consumers from inappropriately taking drugs whose risks are
unknown but potentially grave.' Virginia Board of Pharmacy
sought to further the consumers' interest in receiving truthful
information about products. That rationale does not extend to
information that may be as misleading as it is helpful.
With that general submission as a backdrop, the defense of the
disclaimer provision becomes simple. Authorizing the FDA to
require disclaimers on advertisements that, in the agency's view, fail
to adequately address the risks posed by the drug or to inform
consumers about the risks that inhere in taking a newly approved
drug easily passes constitutional muster. Ever since Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel,'22 it has been settled that disclaimers
authority to screen a product's labeling before a drug is approved by the FDA, and the label and
accompanying advertising is made public. See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 109.
119. My purpose here is not to exhaustively review the arguments that could be made in
support of or in opposition to the constitutionality of these proposals. My purpose is more
modest, which is simply to show the complexity of the problems that confront courts in
commercial speech cases, and, later on, to explain why this illustration bears out Professor
Shiffrin's concerns.
120. See generally Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 109.
121. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993) (requiring the government to
"demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to
a material degree.").
122. 471 U.S. 626 (1985); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
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are a favored First Amendment remedy. 123  Indeed, in Shalala v.
Pearson,124 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that, rather than place more restrictive
restraints on speech, the FDA was required to use disclaimers and
warnings to solve the problem of potential consumer deception, if at
all possible.1
25
The more serious objection would be to authorizing the FDA to
impose a moratorium on DTC ads for up to two years. Moratorium
proponents would begin their argument by pointing out that
Congress has drawn the FDA's authority as narrowly as possible to
address a serious, but infrequently occurring problem. To ensure that
the FDA did not use its authority inappropriately, Congress would
carefully circumscribe the agency's authority to restrict DTC ads.
First, the FDA may impose a moratorium only if it determines that
DTC advertising for a particular drug poses an unreasonable risk to
public health and that disclaimers would be "inadequate to protect
public health and safety.' 26  Second, the authorization applies only
after the FDA determines that "additional information about serious
risks" needs to be compiled. 27  And finally, in making this
determination, the FDA must consider a host of factors going to the
drug's risk, a patient's ability to obtain substitute products, and the
"extent to which clinical trials used to approve the drug may not have
identified serious risks that might occur among patients expected to
be treated with the drug."'
2t
The constitutional argument would be strengthened by the
practical necessity of giving the FDA this authority. After all, the
extensive safeguards that are built into the provision contemplate a
123. 44 Liquormart v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opinion) (observing that state
regulation to "require[] the disclosure of beneficial consumer information" should not be subject
to demanding scrutiny); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 (Stevens, J., concurring).
More recently, the Court has held that some compelled, non-factual claims must be subject to
First Amendment scrutiny. This can be seen for example in United States v. United Foods, 533
U.S. 405, 411 (2001). But the Court has also held that government speech, even if subsidized by
a private party, is not subject to First Amendment analysis. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n,
544 U.S. 550 (2005).
124. 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
125. Id. at 658-60.
126. Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007, H.R. 1561, 110th Cong. §
101 (O)(4)(H) (2007).
127. Id.
128. Id. at § 101(O)(4)(H)(i) to (v).
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situation in which the FDA has to make a tough decision-whether
to approve for marketing a drug that holds promise for some patients,
but whose risks are not fully understood and are deemed serious. If
the FDA's only choice is to approve the drug, and in so doing, permit
unrestrained DTC advertising, then the prudent choice may well be
to hold off on approval until those risks are better understood, even
though that choice will deprive some patients of a new and perhaps
more effective drug. A powerful justification for this provision is
that it offers the agency another, perhaps more rational, choice-
approve the drug, but dampen unwarranted consumer demand by
restricting DTC advertising until the drug's risk profile is better
understood.'29
2. Arguments Against Constitutionality
There are, of course, serious constitutional objections to such a
proposal, most of which go to the FDA's power to block DTC ads
for up to two years. Drug companies invest heavily in DTC
advertising because the ads influence patient-consumer behavior. 3
Supporters of DTC ads cite their informational and educational role
as a distinct advantage-that is, they get critical information in the
hands of patients and not just their doctors. 3' DTC ads empower
patients to take control over their own health care and make better
informed choices, goals plainly in keeping with the autonomy and
self-expression values embedded in the First Amendment.
3 2
The argument against any kind of advertising ban-even one of
limited duration-would find support in the case law. Most
important would be the Court's decision in Thompson v. Western
129. This is just what happened when the FDA approved the new diabetes drug Symlin. As
part of the negotiations over the drug's approval, the company agreed not to engage in DTC
advertising for two years and to forego advertising in journals for one year. Although the
company has not complained, the FDA has been criticized by industry for pushing the company
to limit its advertising as part of the approval process. See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, Drug Safety
Proposals And the Intrusion of Federal Regulation into Patient Freedom and Medical Practice,
26 HEALTH AFF. 664, 671 (2007).
130. See, Nov. 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 12-14.
131. See generally, id. at 16.
132. There is empirical evidence that supports the proposition that DTC ads have some
educational benefit; they spur patients to ask their doctors about prescription drug treatments,
and, on occasion, get a diagnosis for a previously unknown medical condition-some of which
involve high priority conditions such as asthma and high blood pressure. See, e.g., DONNA V.
VOGT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR CONG., DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Mar. 25, 2005); K. Aikin, supra note 64, at 3-4.
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States Medical Center,'33 where a divided Court struck down a
federal law authorizing pharmacists to "compound" drugs, but
prohibiting pharmacists from advertising their services. The law had
been crafted to permit pharmacists to compound specialty drugs not
generally on the market but needed by a handful of patients.'3 4 But
Congress was wary that pharmacies were not equipped to engage
safely in the mass compounding of drugs and wanted to ensure that
pharmacy compounding was limited to special circumstances.' 35 In
ruling against the FDA, the majority discounted Congress's
judgment that public health imperatives justified the advertising
restraint. The majority concluded instead that Congress would have
to find non-speech means to achieve its objective of limiting
compounding activities by pharmacies.' 36 In so ruling, the majority
gave considerable emphasis to the free speech rights of the
pharmacists, so much so that those rights took precedence over
public health objectives deemed by the Court to be valid and
significant. '37
Supporters of DTC ads would likely contend as well that a
blanket restriction on DTC advertising, even a targeted one of
limited duration, runs afoul of the Court's well-known hostility to
categorical bans on speech that is not demonstrably false,
misleading, or deceptive. Although the Court could not find
133. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
134. Id. at 357-58.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 372. It may be hazardous to read too much into the Western States decision,
especially since the impact of the ruling was to void the statute in its entirety. The ruling resulted
in the withdrawal of authority for pharmacists to engage in compounding. This somewhat odd
result came about because the Ninth Circuit ruled that, although the statute violated the First
Amendment rights of pharmacists, the statutory authorization for compounding was not severable
from the advertising ban, and thus the entire statute was invalid. See 535 U.S. at 366.
Remarkably, the pharmacists did not challenge the severability ruling in the Supreme Court. Id.
Thus, when the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment, the pharmacists' victory
became a pyrrhic one, and Congress has not revisited the compounding issue since the Court's
ruling.
137. Id. at 369. The Court's newfound concern over the expressive rights of the speaker in
economic regulation cases was also evident in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525
(2001), where the Court invalidated a Massachusetts regulation restricting the outdoor advertising
of tobacco products. The Lorillard majority based its ruling in part on the notion that the
Massachusetts regulation went too far in interfering with the tobacco companies' ability to get its
selling message to willing adult smokers. Id. at 555-61. More recently, the Court's decision in
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007), appears to require, at least in the election
context, a constitutional regime in which non-profit corporations are entitled to the same First
Amendment protections as individuals.
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common ground over a rationale in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 38 each Justice made clear that an outright ban on truthful
commercial speech that keeps consumers "in the dark" about a
lawful product would come before the Court with a heavy burden of
justification.'39 There are, it should be recognized, a number of
salient differences between DTC advertising of drugs and 44
Liquormart. For one thing, here, in contrast to 44 Liquormart, it is at
least arguable that the ban is not a categorical one because drug
companies would face no restraint in advertising and promoting the
drug to physicians. For another, drugs are subject to even more
extensive regulation than alcoholic beverages, including a federal
ban on their direct sale to patients in the absence of a prescription.
But this paternalism argument would nonetheless carry weight with a
court. After all, a court would have good reason to be skeptical
about the government's claim that it is in the patient's best interest to
be kept in the dark about a new medication that might be effective in
treating the patient's ailment.
Finally, DTC advertising supporters would invoke the Court's
First Amendment decision in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,4 '
which overturned a Massachusetts regulation severely limiting
outdoor tobacco advertising. A majority of the Justices found that
the regulations satisfied the third part of the Central Hudson test by
directly and materially advancing Massachusetts' interest in
deterring tobacco usage by minors."' But a different majority
concluded that the regulations failed to satisfy Central Hudson's
proportionality test because the regulations would effectively ban
outdoor tobacco advertising in most of the State's urban areas,
thereby preventing the companies from communicating their sales
messages to adults.'42 Supporters of DTC advertising would argue
that the FDA's power to ban was no more constrained than the
authority Massachusetts asserted in Lorillard, because an FDA-
imposed ban would effectively cut off a company's ability to
communicate with the patients who are the ultimate consumers of
their products.
138. 517 U.S. 484(1996).
139. Id. at 501-04 (plurality opinion); id. at 526-28 (Thomas, J., concurring).
140. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
141. Id. at 555-61.
142. Id. at 561-66.
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B. The Second Proposal
The second proposal, offered by Representative Anna Eshoo,
would enact a flat ban on DTC ads in broadcast media.143 Under the
second proposal, DTC ads in newspapers and magazines would not
be restricted, nor would any restriction be placed on advertising and
promotional campaigns directed at doctors or other health care
professionals licensed to prescribe drugs.
1. Arguments Supporting Constitutionality
Representative Eshoo and her co-sponsors do not see a First
Amendment problem with her proposal. They contend that
prescription medication cannot be purchased directly by patients for
a reason--questions about whether a drug should be prescribed at all,
and, if so, which drug should be prescribed, are ones that should be
decided by doctors with specialized medical judgment. Non-experts
have no business making these determinations. DTC ads distort that
judgment because they encourage patients to demand medications
that may not be best-suited for them. They demand drugs not on the
basis of a detailed understanding of the scientific factors that go into
selecting drugs, but on the basis of thirty- or sixty-second
commercials that are skillfully designed to stimulate demand. And
doctors often succumb to patient pressure, or patients "doctor-shop"
until they find a doctor willing to write the prescription the patient
wants. Medical organizations generally see DTC ads as a threat to
the doctor-patient relationship for just that reason."
Supporters of the proposal also contend that a DTC advertising
ban limited to the broadcast media leaves open ample channels of
communication. Drug companies would remain free to promote their
drugs to doctors and other health care providers, and could reach
consumers with print ads that, presumably, are more informative
than brief broadcast ads. And they argue that cases like Red Lion
143. During the House deliberations on drug safety legislation, Rep. Anna Eshoo offered an
amendment to ban DTC advertising by adding to section 301 of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act a provision that said "[t]he sponsorship of direct-to-consumer broadcast advertising
of any drug" is a prohibited act.
144. See, e.g., American College of Physicians, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug
Advertising: Position Paper, at 17 (2006) (opposing DTC advertising because, among other
things, it "undermines the patient-physician relationship and oflen leaves patients confused and
misinformed about medications.") available at http://www.acponline.org/hpp/direct-prescript
.pdf.
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establish that the government is entitled to regulate broadcast
advertising more strictly than advertising in other media, because the
spectrum is a scarce public good that Congress has a right to
supervise."' That justification was sufficient to uphold a ban on
broadcast advertising of cigarettes, although the challenge to that ban
came before Virginia Board of Pharmacy.'46
Nonetheless, the burden of justifying an advertising ban on a
lawful product is a heavy one, and the Court has signaled its
willingness to abandon the Central Hudson test in favor of a tougher
standard when confronted with a product ban that effectively keeps
consumers in the dark.'47 In response, the ban's proponents would
make two related arguments. First, relying on a line of cases that
includes Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood
Academy,'48 Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,'49 and Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass 'n, 5° proponents of the ban would argue that the Court
has often upheld restraints carefully tailored to shield vulnerable
individuals from selling messages they may not be capable of
evaluating or verifying on their own. This defense is not based on
the nature of the message as much as it is based on the inability of
the audience to evaluate it. For instance, in Tennessee Secondary
School, the Court upheld a ban forbidding coaches from directly
soliciting impressionable high school athletes; in Florida Bar, the
Court upheld a ban on lawyers soliciting recent accident victims and
their families; and in Ohralik, the Court upheld a ban on lawyers
145. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943).
146. Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 583 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court), affd
without opinion sub nom. Capital Broad. Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). It bears
noting that no cigarette company challenged the ban after Virginia Board of Pharmacy ruled that
commercial speech merits constitutional protection. A similar ban was put in place for
advertising smokeless tobacco products on broadcast media in 1986, see 15 U.S.C. §4402(f), but
the industry has not challenged that restriction either.
147. In 44 Liquormart, noted above, at least four Justices indicated their willingness to
replace Central Hudson with a stricter standard in cases involving categorical bans on truthful
speech. See 517 U.S. at 501-04 (Stevens, J., concurring along with Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.);
id. at 526-28 (Thomas, J., concurring). I say "at least" four Justices because Justice Scalia's
concurrence is less than clear on whether he intended to join the block of Justices calling for the
overhaul of the doctrine. See id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring).
148. 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007).
149. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
150. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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engaging in in-person solicitation of teenage accident victims.
Arguably, this case is no different. Here, the ban is based on the
judgment that ordinary consumers-unskilled in the intricate science
of drug evaluation-are incapable of evaluating DTC claims on their
own. If left to their own devices, consumers might easily be
persuaded to choose less effective or riskier medications based not
on sound medical judgment, but on brief but powerful television ads.
Congress has a substantial interest in averting those judgment errors,
especially since, as we learned with Vioxx and Celebrex, patients
pay for errors not just with their wallets, but with their well-being.
The second argument would build on the first, but instead of
focusing on the audience for the advertisements, it would focus on
the content of the ads. Proponents contend that DTC advertising
imperils the health of the American public by offering exaggerated,
incomplete, and deceptive information about drugs. DTC ads are
inevitably misleading because it is impossible to present accurate and
balanced information about the benefits and risks of a drug in a
commercial that is typically thirty to sixty seconds long. Moreover,
the proponents would argue, the primary purpose of DTC advertising
is not to educate consumers, but instead is to encourage them to
actively seek out medication that their physician would not otherwise
prescribe. The empirical evidence supports that claim. 5' These
reasons, the ban's supporters would claim, render all DTC
advertising misleading and subject to plenary regulation by
Congress.'5 2
151. See, e.g., Dominick L. Frosch, et al., Creating Demand for Prescription Drugs: A
Content Analysis of Television Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 5 ANNALS OF FAM. MED. 6
(2007) (empirical study of DTC ads; finding that they are aimed principally at making an
emotional appeal to consumers, "possibly prompting consumers to request prescriptions that are
clinically inappropriate or more expensive than equally effective alternatives") available at
http://www.annfammed.org/cgi/reprint/5/1/6 (last visited on Oct. 6, 2007); Mike Mitka,
Researchers Critical of TV Drug Ads, 293 JAMA 939 (2007).
152. Because the commercial speech doctrine is aimed at fostering intelligent and well
informed decisions by consumers, the Court has rejected efforts to extend protection to false,
misleading or deceptive information. Justice Stewart's concurrence in Virginia Board of
Pharmacy still best expresses the Court's view on this matter: "the elimination of false and
deceptive claims serves to promote the one facet of commercial price and product advertising that
warrants First Amendment protection-its contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable
information relevant to public and private decisionmaking." 425 U.S. at 781 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Similar statements are commonplace in the Court's decisions. See, e.g., Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring); Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002).
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2. Arguments Against Constitutionality
Opponents of a DTC advertising ban would start their attack
with 44 Liquormart, which is emblematic of the Court's hostility to
categorical restraints denying consumers information about lawful
products. Their argument would be that the DTC advertising ban is a
one-size-fits-all restraint on the dissemination of truthful information
imposed to deprive consumers of important information relating to
their own medical care. This, opponents would claim, is the height
of paternalism--even worse than the paternalism criticized by the
Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy. At least in Virginia Board of
Pharmacy, patients had access to information about what medication
might best treat their ailment; only price information was subject to
restraint. Here, the avowed purpose of the ban-to limit the ability
of patients to be full participants in making decisions about their
medical treatment-is its fatal First Amendment flaw. Many of the
Court's cases support the view that bans on the dissemination of
truthful information cannot, except in rare cases, survive First
Amendment review.
53
Opponents of the ban would also argue that it fails Central
Hudson's requirement that restraints must be proportional to the
interests served. They would contend that a more narrowly drawn
restraint could serve Congress's interests equally well. Congress has
many less intrusive options. Congress could, for instance, give the
FDA broader authority to identify and sanction DTC ads that are, in
fact, false, misleading or deceptive. Congress could provide the
FDA with greater resources to oversee DTC advertising. Or
Congress could give the FDA the resources to educate consumers
about the risks that newly approved drugs carry. Cases like Lorillard
Tobacco, which held that Massachusetts' near-complete ban on
outdoor tobacco advertising in urban areas was fatally overinclusive,
would provide a strong foundation for these proportionality
arguments.
V. WHAT WOULD A COURT Do?
Professor Shiffrin has recently been quoted in the New England
Journal of Medicine as saying that "it's more likely than not that [a
ban on DTC ads] will be struck down," but it is unclear whether
153. E.g., Rubin, 514 U.S. 476; Thompson, 535 U.S. 357.
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Professor Shiffrin was speaking about a complete ban on broadcast
ads or a more tailored, limited-duration ban of the kind outlined in
the first proposal.154 Professor Post, a leading First Amendment
scholar and a participant in this Symposium, is quoted in the same
article as saying that "[t]o ban direct-to-consumer drug advertising
for new drugs, there would have to be something particularly unsafe
about the drugs." '155 Whether the standards set out in the first
proposal would meet Professor Post's test is unclear, but Professor
Post's formulation suggests that something more than uncertainty
about a drug's safety might be needed to justify a ban on DTC
advertising for that drug.
My own view, although not strongly held, is that courts would
likely uphold the first proposal as a carefully targeted restraint aimed
at addressing a serious public health problem for which there is no
other sensible solution. Congress must have some room to take
reasonable and tailored measures to avoid a recurrence of the
problems that were evident with the overzealous and less-than-
accurate DTC promotions of Vioxx and Celebrex.'56 And it is hard
to see how Congress could more carefully confine the FDA's
authority. As the Institute of Medicine and the Government
Accountability Office have found,'57 the evidence demonstrates a
clear link between DTC advertising and the overutilization of newly
approved, potentially high-risk drugs. Courts would of course worry
about the paternalistic nature of the restraint and would scrutinize
carefully the claim that non-speech means would not effectively
achieve the government's objective. But they would also take
seriously the concern that DTC ads threaten to strain the doctor-
154. Although the article is not clear on this point, Professor Shiffrin has confirmed that, in
his opinion, courts would strike down both proposals on First Amendment grounds. His own
view, however, is that neither proposal contravenes the First Amendment and, if enacted into law
and challenged, should be upheld.
155. See Miriam Shuchman, M.D., Drug Risks and Free Speech--Can Congress Ban
Consumer Drug Ads?, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2236, 2236 (2007).
156. I recognize that Central Hudson stacks the deck against the government, and that the
test, as currently applied by the Court, gives little deference to legislative judgments about the
seriousness of the government's interest, the fit between the governmental interest at stake and
the restraint imposed, and the absence and ineffectiveness of non-speech alternatives. See
generally Vladeck, supra note 48. Nonetheless, courts generally resolve commercial speech
cases based on a pragmatic, context-specific, all-things-considered balancing of the interests at
stake. Id. In this case, I think that these interests weigh in favor of the limited ban.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 76 & 85.
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patient relationship and that DTC ads often persuade patients to take
drugs that carry an unjustified risk to their health.
The closest case, in my view, is Florida Bar v. Went for It,
Inc., 5 8 where a divided Court, on the basis of a record far less
developed than the one on DTC advertising, upheld a limited
duration ban (there thirty days) prohibiting lawyers from contacting
recent accident victims and their families.'59 In my view, the public
health imperative at issue here is far more weighty than the privacy
interest at stake in Florida Bar. Whether the Court would be willing
to uphold a restraint that can last up to two years while the company
and the FDA gather safety data is hard to predict, but on balance I
think that the courts would see this statute as a sensible way to
accommodate competing interests.
I am less sanguine that a court would uphold the second
proposal's ban on broadcast DTC ads. There are, in my view, sound
arguments supporting a ban on DTC advertising: the FDA's inability
to fully assess a drug safety's prior approval; Congress's judgment to
entrust prescribing decisions to physicians, not patients; and the rift
DTC ads drive between patients and their doctors. But the fact that
Congress gave physicians the sole power to select prescription drugs
for their patients does not mean that Congress can deny patients
information about newly approved drugs that might help them have
informed interactions with their doctor while also allowing a patient
to take a role in protecting their health and well-being. Moreover,
after the Court's decision in 44 Liquormart, I think it would be
difficult for a court to uphold the kind of blanket ban described in the
second proposal. On the other hand, although it has many
opportunities to do so, the Court has not abandoned Red Lion. Thus,
it is possible that a less intrusive form of scrutiny would be applied
by the courts because the ban applies only to broadcast media, which
might rescue the ban from invalidation.
VI. A PROBLEM THAT IS MANY PROBLEMS, AND THE SMALL
QUESTIONS THAT WILL NOT Go AWAY
The preceding discussion highlights the complexity of the legal
questions that would arise if Congress enacted a law limiting DTC
158. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
159. Id. at 635.
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ads and if that law were challenged on constitutional grounds. The
point of the following discussion is to illustrate the enduring nature
of Professor Shiffrin's observation that "the commercial speech
problem is in fact many problems," and that "the small questions will
not go away."'
61
Perhaps most important, the DTC example illustrates the
wisdom of Professor Shiffrin's critique of the pro-protectionist and
anti-protectionist First Amendment theories. For the pro-
protectionists who believe that there should be no distinction made
between commercial and core speech, the DTC advertising example
would be an easy one. In their view, no government-imposed
restraints on DTC advertising are constitutional, except for
restrictions that prohibit false, deceptive, or misleading ads. If the
FDA alleged that an ad violated such a restriction, the burden would
rest on the FDA to prove that the ad is in fact false, deceptive, or
misleading. If the FDA cannot meet that burden, then it would have
no business interceding. Accepting such a view would have two
consequences. First, it would make it impossible for the government
to invoke uncertainty-here, the unknown risks posed by a newly
approved drug-as a justification for a speech restraint. Second, it
would relegate government regulation of DTC advertising to ad-
specific, after-the-fact, enforcement efforts by a resource-constrained
agency. 6' In my view, and I suspect Professor Shiffrin's as well, it
makes little sense to significantly hamstring government's ability to
protect consumers, especially when the Vioxx and Celebrex
examples show the toll that unrestrained DTC ads can exact on the
public's health.1
62
For the anti-protectionists, who believe that commercial speech
should be afforded little, if any, First Amendment protection, the
example is an easy one as well, as Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
160. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 1216.
161. Some drug industry lawyers contend that the First Amendment compels such a regime.
See, e.g., George Evans & Arnold Friede, FDA Regulation for Prescription Drug Manufacture
Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365 (2003) (authors both serve as
counsel to Pfizer).
162. See Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 48. (arguing that a "free country need not protect tobacco
companies or alcoholic beverage companies when they encourage people to consume products
that cause needless death and suffering."). I do not suggest that Professor Shiffrin would see
DTC advertising in the same light. The point is simply that, given Professor Shiffrin's context-
sensitive approach, the fact that DTC advertising poses serious risks to consumers would have to
be considered in any balancing of interests.
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Virginia Board of Pharmacy explained.'63 In their view, selling
prescription drugs does not implicate the First Amendment's purpose
of enlightening "public decision making as to political, social, and
other public issues."'" And for many anti-protectionists, the fact
these ads are disseminated by profit-seeking corporations solely
interested in persuading consumers to buy their drugs only reinforces
the conclusion that the ads do not merit First Amendment protection.
But these arguments overlook the powerful educational role that
DTC ads can and, at times, do play and would turn back the clock to
an era when paternalistic government regulation of speech was
permitted by the Courts. I have no interest in returning to the days of
Valentine v. Chrestensen, and I suspect that Professor Shiffrin shares
that view as well.
The complexity of the issues surrounding DTC advertising also
demonstrates that the commercial speech problem is not a unitary
one, but "is in fact many problems."'65  Most of the commercial
speech doctrine addresses speech relating to the sale of a product-
advertising and promotion. But corporations engage in many forms
of speech that are subject to strict government regulation, but may or
may not fall within the conventional definition of "commercial
speech"--that is, speech that proposes a commercial transaction.'66
DTC advertising provides examples of such speech. Suppose that a
drug company runs a television ad addressing the advantages of a
new class of drugs, but not urging consumers to buy the company's
drug? Or suppose the company sends retirees copies of medical
journal articles that discuss the benefits and risks of the company's
arthritis drug? Or suppose a drug company takes out an ad to defend,
in general terms, DTC advertising?'67 Are these examples of
163. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781-
790 (1976).
164. Id. at 787.
165. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 1216.
166. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). The Court elaborated a more
context-specific test in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983), which
focuses on three factors: (1) whether the speech is directed at the speaker's customers; (2)
whether the speech contains a promotional message about the speaker's product; and (3) whether
the speech is aimed at persuading consumers to buy the speaker's product.
167. These examples are not far-fetched. For instance, Pfizer has produced and aired a 2.5
minute television and internet ad for Celebrex which discusses in depth the risks of gastro-
intestinal bleeding and cardiovascular events associated with both older-generation painkillers
and COX-2s. Further, to give added credibility, the ad claims that it was developed in
consultation with the FDA. The ad can be viewed here: http://www.celebrex.com/content/
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commercial speech? The Supreme Court granted review in Nike v.
Kasky to address these questions, but left them unresolved. Thirty
years after the advent of the commercial speech doctrine we still do
not know its metes and bounds.'68
Professor Shiffrin's caution that "the small questions will not go
away" has also been borne out. The DTC example was intended to
show how complicated and context-specific commercial speech
cases are, and why the problem of categorization (i.e., determining
whether speech falls within the boundaries of the commercial speech
doctrine) is only the first of many questions that arise in assessing
restraints on speech related to economic activity. The other
questions arise because of the difficulty in balancing the myriad
interests that invariably are in play in these cases. And no two cases
are alike. Certainly the legal issues that arise with the regulation of
DTC advertising are different from those that arise with advertising
by lawyers and other professionals, advertising of so-called "sin"
products (such as tobacco, alcohol, and gambling), and advertising
the sale of securities.'69  Each produces its own specialized
jurisprudence. States may restrain in-person solicitation of new
index.jsp?setShowOn=../content/index.jsp&setShowHighlight0n=../content/index.jsp (last visited
on Oct. 6, 2007). The practice of drug companies disseminating favorable studies for unapproved
uses was the subject of Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
There, a corporate-sponsored public interest organization sued the FDA for a declaratory
judgment that drug companies had a First Amendment right to sponsor the distribution of medical
journals to physicians. The court found the case non-justiciable. And although the
pharmaceutical industry has not defended DTC ads in direct ads to consumers, it has heavily
lobbied Congress to permit DTC advertising to continue without restraint.
168. See Shiffrin, supra note, I at 1214-15; see also Nike, 539 U.S. at 655 (2003) (dismissing
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). Nike demonstrated the complexity of simply
drawing the boundaries between "commercial" speech and core political speech-a line-drawing
task that Shiffrin thought pointless. See generally Symposium: Nike v. Kasky and the Modern
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 965-1299 (2004). Line-drawing
problems are of course endemic to First Amendment jurisprudence. The First Amendment carves
out domains based on categories---obscenity, fighting words, public forum, and so forth. In some
instances, categorization determines whether speech receives First Amendment protection at all
(political speech does, obscenity does not). In other instances, categorization defines the degree
of First Amendment protection speech warrants (political speech deserves the most stringent
protection, commercial speech somewhat less). See generally Frederick Schauer, Categories and
the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981).
169. Compare, e.g., Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), and In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), and
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999), with Lowe v. SEC, 472
U.S. 181 (1985).
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clients by lawyers but not by accountants. 17  The government may
strictly regulate the promotion of securities but not of alcoholic
beverages.'7' And the government may restrict advertising for
lotteries so long as it does so comprehensively and not in a piecemeal
fashion.7 2 General First Amendment theories have had little success
in taming the unruly cases that arise when government seeks to
regulate commercial speech.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the DTC example shows that
general First Amendment theories do not help us navigate the
difficult problems that arise in commercial speech cases. Consider
the first proposal to restrict DTC ads. Would broad legal rules
provide much help in deciding whether it passes constitutional
muster? I do not think so. My experience in litigating commercial
speech cases suggests that rule-based approaches are generally too
crude to resolve a difficult case.
VII. CONCLUSION
Professor Robert Post, another symposium participant and
leading First Amendment scholar, recently said that the commercial
speech doctrine is "a notoriously unstable and contentious domain of
First Amendment jurisprudence. No other realm of First
Amendment law has proved as divisive."'7 There are, of course,
many possible responses to such a provocative claim. One might be
to observe that the doctrine, barely thirty years old, is still
experiencing growing pains, and its instability is a reflection of the
Court's continued fine-tuning of a relatively new doctrine. However,
another possible response might be to observe that perhaps the
instability and contentiousness is symptomatic of the doctrinal flaws
Professor Shiffrin identified over twenty years ago. Much of the
divisiveness involves the definitional questions identified by
Professor Shiffrin that have not been answered by the Court, and
much of the instability reflects the Court's struggle to address "the
170. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), with Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761 (1993).
171. Compare Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), with Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476 (1995).
172. Compare United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993), with Greater New
Orleans Broad. Co. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
173. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2
(2000).
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small questions" that, as Professor Shiffrin predicted, have not gone
away.
POSTSCRIPT
After this article was written, Congress enacted the Food and
Drug Administration Amendments of 2007.174 Congress gave
extensive consideration to whether to impose more stringent rules for
DTC advertising, and made three changes to the law that are
pertinent here. First, the Amendments grant the FDA authority to
require the submission of any television ad for a drug 45 days prior
to broadcast.175 The FDA must review the ad within this time
frame.16 The FDA may make recommendations to ensure that the ad
is consistent with "consumer good and well-being," and that the ad
properly represents prescribing information and the efficacy of the
drug in specific subpopulations (e.g., the elderly, children, ethnic and
racial groups). 177 But the FDA may not require the sponsor to accept
its recommendations. 17 If the agency determines that the ad may be
false or misleading, the agency may require the sponsor to make
affirmative disclosures about the drug's risks or the date of the
drug's approval, but only for a period not to exceed two years.
79
Second, the Amendments give the FDA the power to impose civil
money penalties against drug sponsors for disseminating DTC ads
that are "false or misleading."'8 ° Civil penalties can be as high as
$250,000 for the first violation and up to $500,000 for each
subsequent violation within three years.' Civil penalties may be
imposed only after providing the sponsor notice and an opportunity
for a hearing, and no penalty may be imposed if the ad was pre-
screened by the FDA and took into account comments received from
the FDA."2 In that way, the Amendments strongly encourage
companies to have their ads pre-screened by the FDA. Third, the
174. Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
175. See id. sec. 901, § 503B(a), 121 Stat. at 939.
176. Id.
177. Id. sec. 901, § 503B(c), 121 Stat. at 939.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. sec. 901, § 503B(f)(4), 121 Stat. at 940.
181. Id.
182. Id. sec. 901, § 503B(g)(4)(A), 121 Stat. at 941.
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Amendments provide an authorization for over $6 million annually
in increased funding to enhance the FDA's resources for advertising
reviews. ,83
183. Id. sec. 104.
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